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For many years it was widely held among economists that ﬁrms could not exercise market
power collectively without some form of explicit coordination. However the theory of
repeated games has cast some doubt on this approach. Stable arrangements may require
little coordination between ﬁrms, and possibly none at all. This has raised a dilemma
for the design of a policy towards collusion. If the legal standard focuses on explicit
coordination, a large number of collusive outcomes can fall outside the prohibition, and
if it tries to cover collusion without explicit coordination, it will prohibit non-cooperative
practises.
Article 81(1) of the Rome Treaty stipulates that agreements or concerted practises
between ﬁrms which distort competition are prohibited. What is meant by “agreements”
and “concerted practises” is not further speciﬁed in the treaty. However, decisions recently
taken by the Commission show that often ﬁrms behavior that do not involve a process of
coordination are overlooked although they could mean an exercise of market power.
The literature about collusion, mainly deal with two diﬀerent approaches. Firstly,
there are the papers that investigate cartel stability in static models. They have mainly
focused on the incentives of ﬁrms to participate in a cartel agreement. These papers focus
on ﬁrms ”participation constraints”. Two diﬀerent incentives play a role here. Firms
face a trade oﬀ between participation and nonparticipation in the cartel: ﬁrms have an
incentive to join the cartel so as to achieve a more collusive outcome, but on the other
hand have an incentive to stay out of the cartel to free-ride on the cartel eﬀort to restrict
production. By their very nature, in these models cartel members do not cheat on a cartel
agreement as it is assumed that agreements are sustained through binding contracts, they
may, therefore, be viewed as models of binding collusion1. The seminal papers in this
literature are Selten (1983) and d’Aspremont et al. (1983)
There is another strand in the literature on cartel stability, which takes a quite dif-
ferent route. The supergame-theoretic approach to collusion has focused on the problem
1A formal collusion agreement among competing ﬁrms (mostly oligopolistic ﬁrms) in an industry
designed to control the market, raise the market price, and otherwise act like a monopoly is frequently
also termed explicit collusion. Binding collusion refers, therefore, to an explicit collusive agreement
enforceable at law.
1of enforcement of collusive behavior (see for example Friedman (1971)). In these models,
seemingly independent, but parallel actions among competing ﬁr m si na ni n d u s t r ya r e
driven to achieve higher proﬁts. It is termed tacit or implicit collusion. This focuses on
ﬁrms “incentive constraints”2. Then, what this approach leaves out, are ﬁrms’ "partici-
pation constraints": it cannot explain why many real world cartels do not comprise all
ﬁrms in the industry. Instead, they have studied under which circumstances collusion
can be sustained as an equilibrium of the repeated game. Most research on the ﬁeld has
studied symmetric settings and have focused on the sustainability of the most proﬁtable
symmetric equilibrium. The reason to select this equilibrium is that it will be the one that
ﬁrms will agree to play if they secretly meet to discuss their pricing plans (Mas-Colell et
al (1996)).
The main point of the paper is that this argument is compelling but it does not take
into account that ﬁrms may prefer not to attend this meeting in order not to participate
in the coordination to a collusive agreement. This takes us back to the literature on the
incentive to participate in a cartel, mentioned above. However, now the analysis is richer
because one has to study how does the participation incentive interact with the incentive
to maintain a collusive agreement. As a ﬁrst step, I study how does the size of a cartel
aﬀect the possibility that its members can sustain a collusive agreement in a supergame
theoretical framework. I obtain that collusion is easier to sustain the larger the cartel
is. To obtain the result I study the sustainability of partial cartels i.e. cartels that do
not include all the ﬁrms in a given industry. Partial cartels are often observed in reality,
being the OPEC the most well known example.
The previous result has implications on cartel formation, because it reduces the in-
centives to free-ride from a cartel by defecting from it. I can illustrate the idea with the
following extreme example. I ﬁnd that for some discount factors, the only sustainable
cartel is the cartel that comprises all ﬁrms in the industry. Then all ﬁrms have incen-
tives to participate in the cartel, because otherwise collusion completely collapses. This
completely eliminates the gains from free-riding at the participation stage.
Obviously, in practice it is easier to ﬁght binding collusion than against implicit col-
lusion. The model highlights that policy measures that induce ﬁrms to replace binding
2”Participation constraints” are ﬁrms incentives to join the cartel or the fringe; meanwhile ”Incentive
constraints” are the incentives to cheat on the cooperative agreement.
2with implicit collusion3 to escape antitrust prosecution may have its costs. Forbidding
binding collusion (and forcing ﬁrms to collude tacitly) has the positive eﬀect of weaken
t h ei n c e n t i v e st om a i n t a i nac o l l u s i v ea g r e e m e n tb u tt h en e g a t i v ee ﬀect of making stronger
the incentives to participate in a cartel4.
Therefore the total eﬀect on price is uncertain. In the particular model I analyze price
is higher with implicit than with binding collusion. The model predicts that the size of the
cartels enforced can be larger in the implicit c o l l u s i o nm o d e lt h a ni nt h ebinding collusion
model.
We can think of several interesting cases where these results could be of interest. In
several European countries, before governments moved to adapt its domestic competition
policy to the European regime, agreements restricting competition among ﬁrms were not
only permitted but also enforceable at law. Namely, Denmark (see OCDE (1993)) where
before the Competition Act of 1990 was passed agreements were widespread in several
sectors and often took the form of binding agreements and also West Germany where
before 1987 hundreds of legalized cartels were enforced through a contract (see Audretsch
(1989)). Switzerland and Sweden are other examples of countries where Cartels were
sustained for decades by means of enforceable contracts. Therefore, the present model
points out a possible consequence of banning binding collusion that perhaps has been
unnoticed by antitrust authorities.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In the following section, the central model
of the paper is set. The sustainability of the partial cartel is analyzed with the ”trigger
strategies”5. In the next section, the participation game is set. Firms decide ﬁrst wether to
3”When the legal advisors of cartel members discovered that Article 85 had to be taken seriously, they
had their clients throw their agreements in the waste basket. Simultaneously, the attention of DG\ IV
shifted to the detection of tacit collusion, on the assumption that explicit collusion was being replaced
by tacit collusion” (Phlips (1995)).
4"Although strict prohibition and strong sanctions probably reduce the incidence of explicit collusion,
continuing cases are good evidence that ﬁrms ﬁnd it proﬁtable to engage in the practice. Firms are
naturally careful not to create good evidence of such agreements. (...) It should be noted, however,
that even if enforcement were 100 percent eﬀective, this would not necessarily put an end to coordinated
interaction. It could simply cause ﬁrms to opt for substitutes which are less likely to attract legal sanctions
and oﬀer the further advantages of greater ﬂexibility and lower costs to arrange: It could be even argued
that ﬁrms prefer less risky, more ﬂexible alternatives to explicit collusion" (OECD (1999) )
5The sustainability of partial cartels in a dynamic setting is considered by Martin (1990) in a ho-
3join the cartel or not, afterwards the ﬁrms inﬁnitely play a quantity game. The main aim
of this section is to study the interaction between incentive and participation constraints.
Afterwards, the sustainability of the partial cartel is analyzed using an optimal penal code
to enforce collusion following Abreu (1986).
mogeneous ﬁrms context. However unlike our model, decision is sequential, that is cartel ﬁrms act as
Stackelberg leaders.
42P a r t i a l C a r t e l s
Assume that n ﬁrms, where n>2, indexed i, i =1 ,2,3,...,n compete in a market whose
demand is given by P(Q)=1−Q. Cost functions of ﬁrms are given by: c(qi)=
q2
i
2 ,w h e r e
qi denotes the production of ﬁrm i. Assume ﬁrms simultaneously choose quantities 6.
A (partial) cartel will be said to be active in this market if there is a group of ﬁrms
(cartel members) that maximize joint proﬁts and the remaining ﬁrms (nonmembers or
fringe ﬁrms) maximize individual proﬁts. When a cartel of k ﬁrms is active, members











nk − k2 +3 k +2+n
(2)
In this situation, Proﬁts of members and nonmembers are given respectively by πk
m
and πk
nm. Observe that if k =1 , we have standard Cournot competition and q1
m = q1
nm.
We are going to study under which conditions playing (1) and (2) in each period can
b es u s t a i n e da sa ne q u i l i b r i u mo fag a m ew h e r et h eo n es t a g eg a m ed e s c r i b e da b o v ei s
repeated inﬁnite times. Firms will be assumed to discount the future at a factor of δ.
Member ﬁrms are denoted with a natural number from 1 to k.
Cartel members will sustain cooperation by using ”trigger strategies”, that is, when
cheating, ﬁrms are punished with inﬁnite reversion to the Nash Cournot equilibrium.
Trigger strategies for a partial cartel can be formulated the following way, where qt,i
denotes the strategy played by ﬁrm i in period t:






m if ql,j = qk
m for any l<t for j =1 ,...,k
qt,i = q1
m otherwise.
Firm i, i = k +1 ,...n plays








nm if ql,j = qk
m for any l<tfor j =1 ,...,k
qt,i = q1
m otherwise.
Nonmember ﬁrms play optimally, because the future play of rivals is independent
of how they play today and they maximize current proﬁts. Member ﬁrms will behave
optimally if the discount factor is high enough. To obtain the conditions on the discount
factor such that using ”trigger strategies” is also optimal for member ﬁrms, we have to
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and will obtain πk
d like the proﬁts obtained in the period of deviation.




















, the previous condition can be written in the following way.
If δk ≥ 1 the cartel of size k can not be sustained for any δ.I fδk < 1, the cartel can
be sustained for δ ≥ δk.
Although it may be surprising at ﬁrst sight that some cartel sizes can not be sustained
in equilibrium, it comes from the well-known result in the literature that with Cournot
competition, mergers (or any other collusive agreement) of a small number of ﬁrms reduces
proﬁts because non-participating ﬁrms react by increasing their production (see Salant et
al.(1983)).
Next proposition shows that the previous intuition extends to any cartel size in the
sense that whenever a cartel of size k is sustainable, cartels of larger size are also sustain-
able7.
Proposition 1 The cutoﬀ discount factor (δk) that sustain the strategies described above,
is strictly decreasing in the size of the cartel.
7Remark the similarity with the result in Salant et al.(1983) that if a merger of k ﬁrms is proﬁtable,
a merger with more ﬁr m si sa l s op r o ﬁtable.

















decreases when k in-
creases because deviation proﬁts increase more than proﬁts from being in the cartel of





also decreases because π1
m
does not depend on k, and deviation proﬁts increase with k. Thus punishment becomes
proportionally more painful. This second eﬀect would decrease δk.
The result from the Proposition 1 comes from the fact that the second eﬀect dominates
the ﬁrst one.
3 The participation game.
In the previous Section we have obtained conditions on the discount factor under which
cartels of diﬀerent sizes are active. In this Section, we will allow ﬁrms to coordinate in the
diﬀerent outcomes by showing their willingness to participate in a collusive agreement.
Those decisions will not aﬀect the payoﬀ of ﬁrms, but they will only be used as a coordi-
nation device: if k ﬁrms decide to participate in a cartel agreement, only cartels of size k
can be observed in the repeated game.
This pre-communication play is modelled as a stage prior to market competition. The
decision of each ﬁrm relates to selecting a zero-one variable wi where:
wi : 1i ﬀ ﬁrm i joins the cartel
0i ﬀ ﬁrm i joins the fringe
If k ﬁrms announce joining the cartel , the future play is only modiﬁed if the discount
factor allows a cartel of k ﬁrms to be active (δ ≥ δk). Otherwise, all ﬁrms play the
Cournot quantity in all periods. In short, once a cartel of k ﬁr m si sf o r m e d ,w ew i l l
7assume that discounted payoﬀs of member and nonmember ﬁrms are respectively given























We are going to look for the Nash equilibrium of the game.
In our model, a cartel of size k is an equilibrium conﬁguration (stable cartel) if the
following two conditions are satisﬁed:






Which means that no cartel ﬁrm wants to leave the cartel, as the proﬁts that this ﬁrm
would obtain by joining the fringe would be no larger than proﬁts obtained by remaining
in the cartel.






If this condition holds no fringe ﬁrm has incentives to join the cartel, as doing so the
proﬁts obtained would be no larger than the proﬁts obtained by staying in the fringe.
This participation game has been previously analyzed in the literature in cases where
ﬁrms can sign binding contracts to sustain the outcome of the cartel8.I n t h a t c a s e
collusion is said to be binding, while in our model is called implicit. With binding collusion
sustainability of cartels is not at issue. Then payoﬀso fp l a y e r sw o u l db el i k e(5) and (6)
taking δk =0 . Solving the participation game for the case of binding collusion will be
both a helpful step to solve it in our case and will provide us a benchmark to compare
the results.
8See Donsimoni (1985). The only diﬀerence is that it considers the Cartel behaves as a Stackelberg
leader while in our case the cartel and nonmember ﬁrms compete à la Cournot.
8The key point in the binding collusion case is that for any cartel size, internal stability
is never satisﬁed. Firms know that the goal of the cartel is to reduce production. Then
ﬁrms will have incentives to leave the cartel in order to free ride from the output reduction
agreed by the remaining cartel members.
Proposition 2 No cartel is stable when collusion is binding.
We are ready now to determine the Nash equilibrium of the participation game. This
game has many equilibria in which no cartel is active. For example all ﬁrms deciding not
to join the cartel is always an equilibrium. For δ<δ n any choice by ﬁr m si sa ne q u i l i b r i u m
because the participation decisions are irrelevant because no cartel can be sustained. To
clarify the analysis I will focus on the equilibria where cartels are active whenever they
exist. It turns out that when they exist, they are unique (except for a permutation of
players). We state the results in the following Proposition:
Proposition 3 No cartel is active in equilibrium if δ<δ n. Whenever δ ∈ [δk,δk−1) and
δk < 1,ac a r t e lo fk ﬁr m si sa c t i v ei ne q u i l i b r i u m .
T h ef a c tt h a tf o rδ<δ n no cartel is active comes from Proposition 1. Therefore we
have only to explain the second part of the Proposition. For δk−1 >δ≥ δk only cartels
of size greater or equal than k can be sustained. Cartels of sizes greater than k are not
stable, because the result in Proposition 2 applies: internal stability does not hold.
The cartel of size k is internally stable, because ﬁrms know that quitting the cartel
means that collusion fully collapses and they would obtain the Cournot proﬁts. Therefore
the cartel of size k is stable. That is, only the smallest cartel among those which can be
sustained are stable in the Participation Game.
Once characterized the equilibrium of the participation game, there are two corollaries
we can extract from Proposition 3.
Simply comparing Proposition 2 and Proposition 3 we get the following conclusion:
Corollary 1 If δ ∈ [δn,1) the size of active cartels is bigger with implicit collusion than
with binding collusion.
Although with binding collusion cartels are always eﬀective, because collusion consists
of cartel members committing themselves to produce a certain agreement by signing
9binding contracts, we can not ﬁnd stable cartels. However with implicit collusion ﬁrms
do not dispose of any commitment power, but when δ>δ n (see Proposition 3) a cartel of
certain size is stable. It is precisely the success of the cartels what reduces the incentive
to participate in them in explicit collusion.
In the previous Section, we checked that cartels were only active if the discount factor
was high enough. Therefore, prices were increasing in the discount factor. In the present
Section, the size of the cartel is determined endogenously. Then, price may decrease with
the discount factor, because it reduces the size of stable cartels. The failure of small
cartels to be sustainable when δ is low, induces ﬁrms to create bigger cartels. This result
is recollected in the following corollary:
Corollary 2 When the size of the cartel is endogenously determined, if δ ∈ [δn,1) price
decreases with the discount factor.
The reason is basically that as long as the cutoﬀ of the discount factor is decreasing
with k,w h e nδ ≥ δn, the larger the discount factor, the lower the size of the cartel that
is stable. Thus as δ increases, smaller cartels associated to lower prices are enforced.
However, when δ is very low (δ<δ n), as long as no agreement is possible, the price is the
Nash equilibrium price.
104 Optimal punishment.
The literature about implicit collusion has treated repeated game models using basically
two diﬀerent types of strategies to enforce subgame perfect Nash equilibria (S.P.N.E.), the
“trigger strategies” and the “stick and carrot” strategies deﬁning an optimal punishment9.
Trigger strategies have been used in the ﬁrst three sections of the model. I obtained that
the cutoﬀ of the discount factor is decreasing in the size of the cartel, and this led us to
the results of the third section. I will see in this section, if it is also true when cooperation
is sustained by an optimal punishment.
Cooperation is sustained now with strategies where cheating ﬁrms are punished with
the fastest and most severe possible punishment. Abreu (1986) outlines a symmetric, two-
phase output path that sustains collusive outcomes for an oligopoly of quantity setting
ﬁrms. The output path considered by Abreu has a “stick and carrot” pattern. The path
begins with a period of low per-ﬁrm output for cartel members (qk
m). The strategy calls
for all cartel members to continue to produce qk
m, unless an episode of defection occurs.
If some ﬁrm cheats on the agreement, all cartel ﬁrms expand output for one period (qp
m)
(stick stage) and return to the most collusive sustainable output in the following periods,
provided that every player of the cartel went along with the ﬁrst phase of the strategies
(carrot stage). As far as fringe ﬁrms are concerned, as the future play of the other ﬁrms
is independent of how they play today, they optimally maximize per period proﬁts. The
”stick and carrot” strategies for a partial cartel can be formulated in the following way,
where qt,i denotes the strategy played by ﬁrm i in period t:
Firm i, i =1 ,...,kplays:
(α)

     




m if qt−1,j = qk
m for j =1 ,...,k ∀t =2 ,3,...,
qt,i = qk
m if qt−1,j = qp
m for j =1 ,...,k ∀t =2 ,3,...,
qt,i = qp
m otherwise.
9The latter were ﬁrstly set in a seminal paper from Abreu (1986). These strategies became popular
in the literature given their optimality and their renegotiation-proofness quality.
11Firm i, i = k +1 ,...,n plays:
(β)

     




nm if qt−1,j = qk
m,f o rj =1 ,...,k ∀t =2 ,3,...,
qt,i = qk
nm if qt−1,j = qp
m,f o rj =1 ,...,k ∀t =2 ,3,...,
qt,i = qp
nm otherwise.
Following Abreu (1986), the strategies described above are considered optimal, that
is, they sustain the highest range of collusive outcomes among all possible punishment
phases, if continuation proﬁts after unilateral deviation in any period, equal the Minimax
value of ﬁrms. In our model it is equal to 0,a sﬁrms can always decide not to be active












m has been deﬁned in section two like proﬁts obtained by cartel ﬁrms when cartel
and fringe ﬁrms produce (1) and (2) respectively, and πs
m(qp
m) are cartel ﬁrms proﬁts if











We need the conditions for the strategies (α,β) to conform a S.P.N.E. On one hand,
we need that if ﬁrms are in a collusive phase (carrot stage), proﬁts that a ﬁrm would
obtain if deviates from collu s i o ns h o u l db en ob i g g e r( g i v e nt h a tt h er e s to ft h eﬁrms












m)) no deviation in the carrot stage (8)
πk
d has already been deﬁned in section two like the proﬁts that a cartel ﬁrm obtains
when unilaterally deviates from the collusive agreement.
12On the other hand, if we are in a punishment phase (stick stage), we need that ﬁrms
obtain higher proﬁts in the punishment phase than deviating from it. Therefore, ﬁrms do















m)) no deviation in the stick stage (9)






(1 − (k − 1)qp




We have to see how to get qp
m,a n dqp
nm, such that if the discount factor is high enough,
collusion will be sustained with the strategies (α,β),c o n f o r m i n ga tt h es a m et i m e ,a n
optimal punishment.
Regarding qp
m,i tm u s tb es u c ht h a t(7) holds. From (9) and (7) we obtain that no
deviation in the stick stage is only possible if πs
d(qp
m) ≤ 0,s i n c eo t h e r w i s eaﬁrm can deviate
in the ﬁrst period and keep doing so every time the punishment is reimposed. Hence, the





m) ≤ 0 ⇐⇒ q
p
m ≥ x,( 1 0 )
which sets a lower bound on the quantity produced in the stick stage. This also implies
that qp
nm =0 . To obtain the lower bound of the discount factor such that (9) and (7)
hold, that we will call δa, we compute (7) for the lowest value of qp

















10The price P(q) is interpreted as price net of marginal cost at zero.
13When δ>δ a, you need a harsher punishment such that (7) is satisﬁed.
As far as deviation in the carrot stage is concerned, we have that from (8) and (7),w e
















F i n a l l y ,w eh a v et h a t(7), (8) and (9) are satisﬁed if the following condition on the
discount factor holds:
δ ≥ max{δa,δb} = δk (13)
On the one hand, δa is decreasing in k. When the number of ﬁrms in the cartel
increases, it is possible to dissuade unilateral deviations without the need of expanding
so much total output. Then proﬁts in the stick stage (πs
m(x)) are increasing in k what
given (11) implies the result.






increase in k more than cartel proﬁts. This make δb increase in k.
Analyzing the behavior of δk in (13), we obtain the following result:
Proposition 4 :T h ec u t o ﬀ discount factor that sustain the strategies (α,β) as a S.P.N.E.






10 and strictly increasing otherwise.
If k is small compared to n, the decreasing eﬀect over δa dominates the increasing
eﬀect over δb(see ﬁg. 1 for a graphic representation). The result is no so tight as in
14Proposition 1, because the cutoﬀ is always decreasing only if n ≤ 8( n<f(n)). However,
t h ef a c tt h a ti sd e c r e a s i n gf o rl o we n o u g hv a l u e so fk (observe that f(n) > n
2) will allow
us to obtain similar results as far as the participation game is concerned.
We proceed to solve the participation game, as we did in section three. Firms show
their willingness to participate in a collusive agreement in a stage previous to play the
”stick and carrot” strategies. The payoﬀs are given by (3) and (4) where now δk is the
one in (13). For the result, we need to deﬁne δ =m i n
k
δk
Proposition 5 :I fδ<δ or δ ≥ δ2, no cartel is active in equilibrium. Otherwise, a
cartel of k ﬁrms is active in equilibrium if δk−1 >δ≥ δk.
This result is analogous to the result in Proposition 3. For δk−1 >δ≥ δk only the
smallest cartel among those which can be sustained is stable in the participation game.
That is because in the smallest sustainable cartel, if ﬁrms do not remain in the cartel,
it means that collusion fully collapses and they would obtain the Nash-Cournot proﬁts
which is worse for them if the cartel enforced has a size greater than two. If δ<δ collusion
is not sustainable and if δ ≥ δ2 ﬁrms are better oﬀ with the Nash-Cournot proﬁts than
with the cartel of size two (see ﬁg. 1).
Given that for δ ∈ [δ,δ2) cartels are active, similar results to the ones in Corollaries 1
and 2 can be derived from Proposition (7).
Corollary 3 :I fδ ∈ [δ,δ2) the size of active cartels is bigger with implicit collusion than
with binding collusion.
Corollary 4 : When the size of the cartel is endogenously determined, if δ ∈ [δ,δ2) price
decreases with the discount factor.
This means that we have exactly the same result we obtained for the case of the
”trigger strategies” when δ belongs to the interval [δ,δ2).
Again, it is the success of the cartels what reduces the incentive to participate in them
with binding collusion. Meanwhile, although ﬁrms do not dispose of any commitment
15power in implicit collusion, it is the threat to the collapse of collusion what provokes the
existence of stable cartels.
Corollary 4 says that, if δ ∈ [δ,δ2), the larger the discount factor, the lower the size

























165C o n c l u s i o n s
The main aim of the paper has been basically to analyze a model of partial collusion
under two diﬀerent approaches. The implicit collusion model approach with two diﬀerent
types of strategies to enforce collusion, showed that the larger the cartel, the easier is to
sustain the cartel. When collusion is binding, that is, ﬁrms can somehow meet and sign
ab i n d i n gc o n t r a c t ,i th a sb e e np r o v e dt h a tt h ei n c e n t i v e st of r e er i d et h ec a r t e lp l a ya
central role, therefore only very small cartels can be enforced.
To be able to compare both models, a participation game has been set. In this model,
an interaction between the incentive and the participation constraints, takes place. The
main conclusion is that implicit collusion can enforce larger cartels than binding collusion,
becoming therefore perhaps of greater concern for antitrust authorities, especially those
countries, namely Holland, Denmark, Switzerland, etc., who moving to adapt its domestic
competition policy to the European regime banned binding collusion.
176 Appendix
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 :W eh a v eδ(k)=πd−πk
πd−π1.I f w e c a l c u l a t e
∂δ(k)
∂k ,w eh a v et h a ti ti s




It is tedious but straightforward to show that, as long as k ≤ n, we obtain that the
derivative is negative.















2 ≥ 2 2k+3
(n(k+1)−(k+1)2+3k+5+n)
2
We can show that the expression of Internal stability is decreasing in k.T h e r e f o r e
showing that the condition does not hold at k =3also proves that coalitions of k ≥ 3
are not stable. When k = n =2 , cooperation is sustainable. For k =2 ,w ec a ns e ei nt h e
internal stability that if n ≥ 3 there are incentives to leave the cartel.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 : I fδ<δ n, no collusive agreement is sustainable, therefore
looking at (3) and (4) we can see that ﬁrms proﬁts are the Nash equilibrium proﬁts and
no cartel can be active in equilibrium.
If δ ∈ [δn,δk] cartels of size k
0,f o ra l lk
0 ∈ [k,n] are sustainable. Using Proposition
2 we can see that no cartel is stable in the explicit game. However, looking again at (3)





nm is hold if k
0 = k with k
0 ≥ 3.T h i s i s t r u e a s
the proﬁts of a cartel of size equal or bigger than 3 are larger than Cournot equilibrium





nm also holds. Therefore, for every discount factor,
only the smallest cartel among those which are sustainable is stable and will be active in
equilibrium.
Proof of Corollary 2: This is straightforward to show, only seeing that the price of
the market is decreasing with k. Therefore, as the conﬁguration enforced in the market
involves smaller cartels, prices decrease.
Proof of Proposition 4: We obtain the cutoﬀ δ for both stages of the punishment phase,
where the envelope of both will be the signiﬁcative cutoﬀ that sustain the strategies.




(k+2)2 are respectively strictly decreasing and strictly increasing with k.T h e r e f o r e
the minimum value of the decreasing δ will be at k = n.S ow ej u s th a v et oc a l c u l a t eu p
to which value the decreasing part is above the increasing part.. Thus the envelope from
above of both cutoﬀs is decreasing with k. If we construct the function δa − δb.W eh a v e




10 . We can see that for smaller k, δa >δ b
therefore the envelope is decreasing.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5 :I fw es e eδa and δb we can check that for every (k,n) whenever
δb = δa = δ,t h i s∈ (0,1).T h a t i s , t h e e n v e l o p e max(δb,δa) is never increasing with k
for all range of k. We know from Proposition 2 that no cartel is stable in the binding
collusion model. Therefore if we look at which are the stable cartels in the implicit
collusion model we see that if δ<δ, no cartel is either stable with implicit collusion
because δ =m i n ( m a x ( δb,δa)) and represents the minimum discount factor from which a
cartel of any size can be sustainable. When δ>δ 2 all sizes of cartels are sustainable but
as no cartel is stable in the participation game, if we apply to the argument of Proposition
3 this fails because Nash-Cournot proﬁts are larger than cartel of size 2 proﬁts. Therefore
no cartel conﬁguration is stable. Whenever δ ∈ (δ,δ2) if we check the stability of those
which are sustainable we can apply exactly the same argument of proposition 3, and the
Corollary 1, and the smallest sustainable cartel is stable.
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